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I. Introduction 
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is experiencing one of 
the world’s worst economic crises in recent history and by far the 
worst in its history.1  Promulgated by failed policies of its two most 
recent presidents, current President Nicolás Maduro and the late 
Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s future economic stability looks bleak.  
Currently, Venezuela’s debt exceeds its Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) by over 100%, hyperinflation is over 400%, unemployment 
is around 20%, and Venezuela is struggling to be current on its bond 
payments.2  This economic crisis has led to a shortage of basic 
 
† J.D. Candidate 2019, University of North Carolina School of Law.  Notes & Comments 
Editor, North Carolina Journal of International Law.  The author would like to thank all 
of the teachers and fellow law students who provided insight, tips, and suggestions on the 
paper.  Their guidance and assistance was invaluable.  
 1 Venezuela’s Worst Economic Crisis: What Went Wrong?, AL JAZEERA (May 3, 
2018), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/venezuela-worst-economic-
crisis-wrong-170501063130120.html [https://perma.cc/2QXF-BK9R]. 
 2 Id. 
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necessities for its people, such as food and medicine, because the 
country has prioritized paying its debts in lieu of these supplies.3  
Thus, the debt of Venezuela and its wholly owned oil company, 
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), require a restructuring in 
order to prevent widespread default.  This Note focuses on 
restructuring PDVSA’s debt, which will, given the dire economic 
situation, be no easy task.4 
PDVSA generates about 95% of Venezuela’s revenue,5 which 
further complicates the restructuring scenario because it is so vital 
to the economy—as PDVSA goes, so does Venezuela.  Notably, 
PDVSA possesses assets located outside of Venezuela, such as 
shares of its subsidiary, PDV Holding, and its most valuable asset 
CITGO Petroleum—both of which are Delaware corporations that 
could be subject to seizure from creditors.6  Along with the 
uncertainty of how to protect its assets in PDV Holding and 
CITGO,7  PDVSA’s creditors vary dramatically.  PDVSA owes 
billions of dollars of claims to secured and unsecured creditors, 
bond holders, promissory note holders, and, possibly, judicial 
 
 3 Patrick Gillespie et al., Venezuela: How a Rich Country Collapsed, CNN MONEY 
(July 30, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/26/news/economy/venezuela-economic-
crisis/index.html [https://perma.cc/K98Q-9VL2] [hereinafter Gillespie et al.]. 
 4 This Note builds upon the ideas and analysis from another paper I coauthored, 
PDVSA’s Hail Mary: A Chapter 15 Bankruptcy Solution, (with Rich Gittings, Samantha 
Hovaniec, Matt Taylor, and Heather Werner), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3161604. 
 5 Dion Rabouin, Venezuela Default More Likely on Sovereign Bonds Than 
PDVSA’s: Bondholders, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
venezuela-debt/venezuela-default-more-likely-on-sovereign-bonds-than-pdvsas-
bondholders-idUSKBN1E92UX [https://perma.cc/RT2V-2YY8]. 
 6 Tom Hals, Venezuelan Creditors Eyeing Citgo Assets Face Uphill Battle, REUTERS 
(Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-citgo-bondholders-
analysis/venezuelan-creditors-eyeing-citgo-assets-face-uphill-battle-idUSKBN1E838E 
[https://perma.cc/9XHB-8MK3]. 
 7 Venezuela can seek a discharge or protection for its assets in PDV Holdings and 
CITGO by having both entities file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States or move 
the account receivables or shares to a bank in Venezuela to escape seizure from creditors.  
See Mark Walker & Richard Cooper, Venezuela’s Restructuring: A Realistic Framework 
11–12, MILLSTEIN & CO. (Sept. 19, 2017) available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3039678 [https://perma.cc/7DSG-HUBQ] [hereinafter 
Walker & Cooper],.  However, it would be more beneficial if PDV Holding and CITGO 
attempted to receive protection from PDVSA’s Chapter 15 proceeding.  This would mean 
their assets would be protected and their debts discharged or significantly reduced. 
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claimants.8  The reluctance of creditors to provide funding and 
credit to PDVSA due to the dire situation, along with PDVSA’s 
dependence on oil and third parties, makes for an uphill battle for 
PDVSA to repay its debt.9 
Adding to the complexity, various nations, including the United 
States, have imposed sanctions against the Venezuelan government 
for its corruption and failure to create sustainable economic 
conditions.10  These sanctions prohibit PDVSA from issuing any 
new debt,11  presenting an almost impossible barrier to overcome for 
any restructuring.12  The restructuring plan detailed below assumes 
that these sanctions will be lifted and leaves PDVSA with one 
question going forward: what is the best way to restructure its debt? 
This Note posits a solution in the form of a Chapter 15 foreign 
bankruptcy proceeding of the United States Bankruptcy Code13 to 
answer PDVSA’s debt restructuring question.14  If successful, this 
plan protects PDVSA’s assets and seriously reduces or completely 
eliminates the debt of PDVSA and its Venezuelan entities from 
 
 8 Id. at 3. 
 9 Id. at 13–14. 
 10 See, e.g., Resolution on EU Political Relations with Latin America, EUR. PARL. 
DOC. P8_TA (2017)0345 (2017), [hereinafter EU Resolution of September 13] available 
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-
TA-2017-0345+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [https://perma.cc/76ND-BS6F] (EU sanctions); 
see also Exec. Order No. 13,808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,155 (Aug. 24, 2017); Exec. Order No. 
13,692, 80 Fed. Reg. 12,747 (Mar. 8, 2015). 
 11 See, e.g., EU Resolution of September 13, supra note 10. 
 12 One way, if not the only, to restructure under the sanctions requires an entity to 
petition to the Office of Foreign Assets Control to obtain a license to engage in the 
prohibited activity.  OFAC License Application Page, TREASURY.GOV, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/licensing.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/U8Z2-TWG9] (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
 13 Ch. 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code enables a U.S. bankruptcy court to recognize 
a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, as long as all of the requirements are met, and then 
provides assistance with the proceeding.  Part of Ch. 15’s goals are to protect financially 
troubled business that involve cross-border insolvencies.  The U.S. court assists with the 
foreign proceeding in order to provide protections of trade, investment, employment, as 
well as protect the interests of creditors and debtors.  See 11 U.S.C.§ 1501(a) (2018) 
(stating the purpose of § 1501).  This Note focuses on restructuring PDVSA bonds, and 
not Venezuela’s bonds, because of the vital importance of PDVSA to Venezuela.  A 
restructuring of these bonds will in turn benefit Venezuela. 
 14 The idea of putting PDVSA through a Chapter 15 bankruptcy proceeding came 
from the work of Mark A. Walker & Richard J. Cooper, in their publication Venezuela’s 
Restructuring: A Realistic Framework, supra note 7.  This Note aims to build upon their 
ideas and to resolve problems that they did not address. 
4 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
promissory note holders, bond debt, and any judicial claims.  
Additionally, this proceeding may also protect the assets and 
discharge the debt for PDVSA’s non-Venezuelan entities, such as 
PDV Holding and CITGO.15  Importantly, even if this plan is 
unsuccessful, pursuing a Chapter 15 bankruptcy provides PDVSA 
benefits and leverage while the bankruptcy court makes its decision.  
Thus, this plan provides a win-win option for PDVSA. 
PDVSA’s debts definitely require a restructuring, but given 
PDVSA’s importance to the Venezuelan economy, a restructuring 
where Venezuela relinquishes its control of PDVSA is not an option 
because it presents a paramount risk that could prove detrimental to 
the Venezuelan economy.  Yet, maintaining ownership in a Chapter 
15 bankruptcy restructuring could violate the absolute priority rule 
of U.S. bankruptcy law that prevents debtors from maintaining 
ownership unless all unsecured creditors are paid in full.16  
Fortunately, Venezuela maintains control without violating the 
absolute priority rule under this Chapter 15 solution by utilizing a 
Chapter 11 § 363 sale that discharges any adverse interests on 
PDVSA’s assets,17  similar to the sale utilized in the General Motors 
bankruptcy in the United States.18  A new government owned entity, 
New PDVSA, would then emerge from the sale with PDVSA’s 
assets without any encumbrances.  Before consummating the sale, 
PDVSA must file under a public-sector insolvency law—which will 
first need to be passed by Venezuela—and PDVSA must petition 
for a Chapter 15 proceeding, meet the eligibility requirements of § 
109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and satisfy the recognition 
requirements of § 1515 and § 1517 of the Bankruptcy Code in order 
to receive relief under Chapter 15.19  If PDVSA fails to meet any of 
 
 15 It is possible that PDVSA’s non-Venezuelan entities, such as PDV Holding and 
CITGO, may receive protection and a discharge from PDVSA’s Chapter 15 proceeding if 
they argue PDVSA’s proceeding significantly relates to their business.  See, e.g., Order 
Recognizing Foreign Proceeding and Granting Additional Relief at 3, In re Hibu, Inc., No 
8-14-70323 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2014) (recognizing “foreign nonmain proceedings” 
as distinct from the court’s adjudication). 
 16 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(B), 1115(a) (2018) (describing provisions for 
unsecured creditor claims, and defining an individual’s estate’s property). 
 17 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018). 
 18 See In re GMC, 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining the sale used in 
General Motors’ bankruptcy proceeding). 
 19 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018) (listing debtor eligibility requirements); 
see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1515, 1517 (2018) (listing foreign representative recognition 
requirements and describing recognition procedure). 
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these requirements, relief will not be granted.20  These requirements 
may prove insurmountable for PDVSA, but PDVSA can present 
strong arguments for each requirement.  Yet, even if PDVSA fails 
to meet these requirements, this solution gives leverage to PDVSA 
and Venezuela in its out of court restructuring negotiations against 
potential holdout creditors.  Thus, PDVSA should consider filing 
for bankruptcy under Chapter 15 because it provides PDVSA 
protection and leverage that no other restructuring plan can offer—
protection of its assets and an increased likelihood of negotiating a 
beneficial out of court restructuring while simultaneously 
presenting its own restructuring possibility that leaves it free and 
clear of adverse interests. 
Analysis proceeds in three parts.  Part II briefly describes the 
current economic crisis in Venezuela and details the policy actions 
of President Maduro and the late President Chávez that laid the 
groundwork for the crisis.  Part III analyzes the Chapter 15 
framework.  Additionally, this section details the benefits and 
leverage PDVSA acquires with each requirement it meets.  Part IV 
concludes by summarizing the arguments and listing potential 
concerns. 
II. Background of the Crisis 
Venezuela leads the world in crude oil reserves.21  With this 
asset and its state-owned oil company, PDVSA, Venezuela 
experienced tremendous growth and became the richest economy in 
South America.22  However, being dependent on a single 
commodity makes an economy more susceptible to economic 
volatility.23  It also presents a vital asset that potential creditors in a 
restructuring would attempt to seize.24  Notwithstanding the 
 
 20 See 11 U.S.C. § 1517(a)(3) (2018). 
 21 Gillespie et al., supra note 3. 
 22 Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, How Venezuela Went From the Richest Economy in 
South America to the Brink of Financial Ruin, INDEPENDENT (May 21, 2017), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/how-venezuela-went-from-the-richest-
economy-in-south-america-to-the-brink-of-financial-ruin-a7740616.html 
[https://perma.cc/VY73-8LDA] [hereinafter Fisher & Taub]. 
 23 See Gillespie et al., supra note 3 (illustrating the volatility caused by Venezuela’s 
reliance on petroleum). 
 24 Mark Weidemaier & Matt Gauthier, Venezuela as a Case Study in Limited 
(Sovereign) Liability, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2882835 [https://perma.cc/D9C5-
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potential for growth, Venezuela spiraled into its worst economic 
crisis.25 
From an economics standpoint, the numbers are eye-opening.  
As Mark Walker from the financial firm Millstein & Co., and 
Richard Cooper from the law firm Cleary Gottlieb point out in their 
restructuring proposal, Venezuela’s economic situation is one of 
drastic proportions.26  They list the following as some of the key 
issues: hyperinflation, debts exceeding $196 billion, reduction in 
reserves, and a collapse of its banking system, reduction in GDP by 
more than 30% in the last few years, a national income reduction of 
51% in the last several years, and debts exceeding GDP by 150%.27   
As will be explained below, the failed policies of its two most recent 
presidents, Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, laid the groundwork 
for this crisis.  Given these financial difficulties and the 
unlikelihood of PDVSA repaying these debts, PDVSA must 
restructure its debts to avoid widespread default. 
Hugo Chávez was elected President in 1998,28  and he remained 
in this position for fourteen years29 by winning four consecutive 
elections.30  His populist ideals centered on overtaking the corrupt 
elite and establishing unity between the different social classes.31  
Upon his first election, he quickly galvanized support for his social 
policies that simultaneously saw a reduction in the check on his 
authority.32  Initially, the people viewed this as beneficial; however, 
corruption, protests, and struggles against those that opposed him 
 
RKTA]. 
 25 See, e.g., Gillespie et al., supra note 3 (illustrating the extent of Venezuela’s 
economic crisis); see also Fisher & Taub, supra note 22 (describing Venezuela’s economic 
crisis). 
 26 See Walker and Cooper, supra note 7, at 1. 
 27 Id. at 24. 
 28 Edgardo Lander, Venezuelan Social Conflict in Global Context, in VENEZUELA: 
HUGO CHÁVEZ AND THE DECLINE OF AN “EXCEPTIONAL DEMOCRACY” 16, 17 (Steve Ellner 
& Miguel T. Salas eds., 2007) [hereinafter Lander]. 
 29 ELENA BLOCK, COMMUNICATION AND LEADERSHIP: MIMETISATION, HUGO CHÁVEZ 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF POWER AND IDENTITY 228 (Kenneth Rogerson & Laura Roselle 
eds., 2016) [https://perma.cc/UD4Y-96UU] [hereinafter BLOCK]. 
 30 Id. at 229. 
 31 See Lander, supra note 28, at 26. 
 32 See, e.g., Fisher & Taub, supra note 22 (“[Chávez] passed a new constitution and 
purged government jobs . . . [and he] abolish[ed] the legislature’s upper house[.]”). 
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resulted, and this created social division.33  Moreover, as Chávez 
grew in power, so too did his control over PDVSA,34  a key 
contributor to Venezuela’s revenue.  Chávez seized the opportunity 
to utilize PDVSA’s funds for social welfare programs, such as 
lowering food prices,35  instead of improving the revenue 
capabilities of Venezuela and PDVSA.  This decimated PDVSA and 
its ability to make money, despite an increase in oil prices.36  The 
price increase prompted Chávez to borrow tremendous amounts of 
money from various creditors,37  which put Venezuela and PDVSA 
in an even weaker position to make money when oil prices dropped 
in 2014.38  Chávez died in 2013, leaving his successor, Nicolás 
Maduro, to clean up the mess.39  Unfortunately, President Maduro 
has exacerbated the situation. 
Facing opposition ever since his election, President Maduro has 
jailed thousands and asserted control over every aspect of the 
government in order to maintain power.40  Because of the continued 
improper management of PDVSA, Maduro’s focus on staying in 
control, and the country’s inability to pay its debts from excess 
borrowing, more money needed to be printed to make payments, 
causing tremendous inflation in the process.41  In an effort to avoid 
 
 33 See, e.g., id. (“When courts challenged Chávez, he gutted them, suspending 
unfriendly judges and packing the supreme court with loyalists.”); see also BLOCK, supra 
note 29, at 229–30 (Chávez was “an elected autocrat that ‘bullied’ those who ‘challenged 
or angered him’; a man leading a ‘socialist revolution’, whose ideologies were ‘never as 
extremist as he or his detractors made out’ . . . . Chávez did not achieve an effective reform 
of the state, but rather ran a centralized and militaristic regime that concentrated ‘all power 
in the president’s hand.’”). 
 34 See, e.g., Fisher & Taub, supra note 22 (“[Chávez] fired 18,000 PDVSA 
workers . . . and replaced them with some 100,000 supporters.”). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Rick Gladstone, How Venezuela Fell Into Crisis, and What Could Happen Next, 
N. Y. TIMES (May 27, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/world/americas/venezuela-crisis-what-next.html 
[https://perma.cc/8ECJ-TM66]. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Fisher & Taub, supra note 22. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Venezuela’s Leader Nicolás Maduro Divides Opinion, BBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20664349 [https://perma.cc/JEN5-
GHQ3]. 
 41 See Gladstone, supra note 36. 
8 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
default and due to the inability to fund the social welfare programs,42 
Maduro froze prices, causing a shortage of food, medicine, and 
inputs.43  As the government prioritized paying its debts over these 
necessities,44  the shortage further increased prices of goods and shut 
down some businesses.45 
The compounding mismanagement from both presidents, 
coupled with the lack of necessities available for its people, has not 
gone unnoticed by other countries.  For example, the United States 
sanctioned several Venezuelan government officials because of the 
corruption, lack of economic sustainability, and political oppression 
under the current regime.46  The sanctions are a way to force Maduro 
and other government officials out of office and to protect American 
bondholders by preventing its citizens from buying Venezuelan and 
PDVSA bonds.47  Specifically, the sanctions prohibit any U.S. 
person from engaging in transactions related to any new debt of 
PDVSA and Venezuela.48  This prevents Venezuela and PDVSA 
from acquiring funds from more creditors.  Additionally, the United 
States blocked property and interests into Venezuela to prevent cash 
flows from entering into the corrupt government.49  Thus, the 
government in Venezuela is being squeezed out to make sure they 
“promote and defend democratic governance.”50  Arguably, 
Venezuela and PDVSA can only pay its debt and restructure if a 
new government is put in place.  Even if the current regime 
continues and the United States lifts the sanctions, a Chapter 15 
bankruptcy proceeding provides a possible restructuring solution. 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Fisher & Taub, supra note 22. 
 45 Katia Porzecanski, Why Venezuela Doesn’t Get it Over With and Default, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-09/why-
venezuela-struggles-so-hard-to-avoid-default-quicktake-q-a [https://perma.cc/R2JZ-
YW5B]. 
 46 Patricia Mazzei, U.S. Sanctions Four More Venezuela Officials, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 
5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/world/americas/venezuela-us-sanctions-
maduro.html [https://perma.cc/5VF9-UBE4]. 
 47 See id. 
 48 Exec. Order No. 13,808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,155 (Aug. 24, 2017). 
 49 See Exec. Order No. 13,692, 80 Fed. Reg. 12,747 (Mar. 11, 2015). 
 50 Venezuela-Related Sanctions, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/venezuela/ [https://perma.cc/83JQ-EBAV] (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2018). 
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III. Restructuring PDVSA with a Chapter 15 Proceeding 
As noted earlier, a default is approaching for Venezuela—the 
country simply does not have enough money to pay its debts.51  The 
last reported number Venezuela had in its reserves accounted for 
less than $10 billion, and that was in July 2017.52  Barring a massive 
investment from Russia or China, the default will happen sooner 
rather than later.53  With this in mind, PDVSA’s debts require a 
restructuring to prevent a widespread default in Venezuela.  
Significantly, because of PDVSA’s vital importance, a Chapter 15 
bankruptcy restructuring should only be done where Venezuela 
maintains control of PDVSA without violating the absolute priority 
rule of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.54  The absolute priority rule, one 
of the key features of the American bankruptcy system, states that 
equity holders in a bankrupt business cannot receive or retain 
anything under the confirmed plan on account of their equity in the 
debtor unless all of the unsecured creditors are paid in full.55  
Venezuela does not violate the absolute priority rule by utilizing a 
Chapter 11 § 363 sale, similar to the General Motors bankruptcy 
proceeding in the United States.56  Under a confirmation plan that 
utilizes a § 363 auction sale, the Venezuelan government would 
create a new corporate entity, New PDVSA, for the purpose of 
buying PDVSA’s assets, then use the bankruptcy procedure to 
“auction” PDVSA, with the new corporate entity acting as a stalking 
horse bidder.57  Because § 363 explicitly allows the assets of a 
 
 51 Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 2–4. 
 52 Patrick Gillespie, Venezuela has Less Than $10 Billion—Lowest Reserves in Over 
20 Years, CNN MONEY (July 17, 2017), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/17/news/economy/venezuela-reserves-20-year-
low/index.html [https://perma.cc/K2AB-8697]. 
 53 Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 10. 
 54 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(B), 1115(a) (2018) (describing provisions for 
unsecured creditor claims and defining an individual estate’s property); see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 363(f) (2018) (avoiding violation of the absolute priority rule by utilizing a Chapter 11 
§ 363 sale that discharges any adverse interests on PDVSA’s assets).   
 55 Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 
444–45 (1999). If the Venezuelan bankruptcy plan violated such a key tenet of American 
bankruptcy law, it is unlikely that the plan would be confirmed by the U.S. bankruptcy 
courts. 
 56 See In re GMC, 407 B.R. at 463–520. 
 57 A stalking horse bid is an initial bid on the bankrupt company’s assets used by the 
debtor to prevent against low bidding.  David Schilli, Asset Sales Under the Bankruptcy 
Code, ROBINSON BRADSHAW PUB. (Apr. 2009), 
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debtor to be sold free and clear of any debts that may have 
encumbered the assets, the Venezuelan government maintains 
continued control of PDVSA free and clear of any adverse 
interests.58  Under this proposed plan, the government of Venezuela 
receives nothing on account of their interest in PDVSA, but would 
instead receive any assets it receives (to the degree to which it 
receives any assets while acting through New PDVSA) instead on 
account of the new value it has contributed to the estate through the 
§ 363 sale.59  Thus, this would not violate the absolute priority rule. 
In order for this to occur, Venezuela must pass a public-sector 
insolvency law, and PDVSA must file under that law.60  Notably, 
the Venezuelan law does not need to be identical to the United 
States’ bankruptcy law, but it should provide some similarities and 
adequate protections.  Case law and other countries that have 
experienced similar situations to Venezuela provide some guidance 
for Venezuela to improve its own chances of gaining recognition.  
After the law passes and PDVSA files for bankruptcy, PDVSA must 
satisfy the person and property eligibility requirements of § 
109(a).61  By arguing that PDVSA is not an instrumentality of 
Venezuela, or, in the alternative, by arguing that Chapter 15’s 
broader scope warrants eligibility as a person, and by opening a 
bank account in New York to establish property in the United States, 
PDVSA meets the eligibility requirements.62  PDVSA satisfies the 
 
https://www.robinsonbradshaw.com/newsroom-publications-Asset-Sales-under-the-
Bankruptcy-Code-04-23-2009.html [https://perma.cc/F36Q-59LG].  Chapter 15 permits 
foreign bankruptcy proceedings to seek assistance from the United States in their 
proceeding.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)-(b) (2018); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4) (2018) (“a 
‘foreign main proceeding’ means a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the 
debtor has the center of its main interests.”); 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(2) (2018) (permitting 
use of § 363 upon recognition of a foreign main proceeding). 
 58 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018). 
 59 See id. § 363. 
 60 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018) (listing who qualifies as a debtor); see 
also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1515, 1517 (2018) (explaining the application and order for recognition 
of a foreign proceeding). 
 61 Only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the 
United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under this title. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) 
(2018). 
 62 See id. 
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recognition requirements of § 151563  and § 151764  by petitioning 
to a U.S. Bankruptcy Court as a foreign main proceeding.  However, 
a U.S. Bankruptcy Court must not invoke § 150665  by finding the 
 
 63 (a) A foreign representative applies to the court for recognition of a foreign 
proceeding in which the foreign representative has been appointed by filing a 
petition for recognition. 
(b) A petition for recognition shall be accompanied by— 
(1) a certified copy of the decision commencing such foreign proceeding and 
appointing the foreign representative; 
(2) a certificate from the foreign court affirming the existence of such foreign 
proceeding and of the appointment of the foreign representative; or 
(3) in the absence of evidence referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), any other 
evidence acceptable to the court of the existence of such foreign proceeding and 
of the appointment of the foreign representative. 
(c) A petition for recognition shall also be accompanied by a statement identifying 
all foreign proceedings with respect to the debtor that are known to the foreign 
representative. 
(d) The documents referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b) shall be 
translated into English.  The court may require a translation into English of 
additional documents. 
11 U.S.C. § 1515 (2018). 
 64 (a) [s]ubject to section 1506, after notice and a hearing, an order recognizing 
a foreign proceeding if— 
(1) such proceeding for which recognition is sought is a foreign main proceeding 
or foreign nonmain proceeding within the meaning of section 1502; 
(2) the foreign representative applying for recognition is a person or body; and 
(3) the petition meets the requirements of section 1515. 
(b) Such proceeding shall be recognized— 
(1) as a foreign main proceeding if it is pending in the country where the debtor 
has the center of its main interests; or 
(2) as a foreign nonmain proceeding if the debtor has an establishment within the 
meaning of section 1502 in the foreign country where the proceeding is pending. 
(c) A petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding shall be decided upon at the 
earliest possible time.  Entry of an order recognizing a foreign proceeding 
constitutes recognition under this chapter. 
(d) The provisions of this subchapter do not prevent modification or termination 
of recognition if it is shown that the grounds for granting it were fully or partially 
lacking or have ceased to exist, but in considering such action the court shall give 
due weight to possible prejudice to parties that have relied upon the order granting 
recognition.  A case under this chapter may be closed in the manner prescribed 
under section 350. 
11 U.S.C. § 1517 (2018). 
 65 Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed 
by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United 
States. 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2018). 
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proceeding to be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the 
United States or for it to be fraudulent.  Finally, the § 36366  plan 
must be confirmed.  Overall, meeting all of the requirements 
presents a tall but surmountable task for PDVSA.  Regardless, even 
if PDVSA fails to commence their proceeding, whether because it 
is ineligible or it is unrecognized, it still gains valuable benefits and 
leverage over potential holdout creditors by going through the 
bankruptcy process. 
A. Making a Public-Sector Bankruptcy Law 
The first step requires Venezuela to enact a public-sector 
bankruptcy law.  As noted above, Venezuela lacks a public-sector 
bankruptcy law.67  Enacting one is a fundamental necessity because 
a foreign proceeding must be ongoing to gain relief under Chapter 
15.68  Venezuela must create this law with the mindset of gaining 
recognition by a U.S. court.  Because comity and cooperation guide 
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts,69  and to improve its own chances of 
recognition, the law should promote fairness and provide adequate 
protections for debtors and creditors.  Thus, some key aspects that 
this law could contain are the benefit of an automatic stay for 
debtors to obtain relief from any attempts at creditor collection,70  
procedural and substantive due process for creditors enforcing their 
claims, an ability to discharge debt, protection of creditors, 
prevention of fraudulent transfers, and the ability for the debtor to 
 
 66 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018) (“The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) . . . 
free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if—
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such 
interest; (2) such entity consents; (3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such 
property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property; (4) 
such interest is in bona fide dispute; or (5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or 
equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.”). 
 67 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018) (listing who qualifies as a debtor); see 
also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1515, 1517 (2018) (explaining the application and order for recognition 
of a foreign proceeding). 
 68 11 U.S.C. § 1501(b)(1) (2018). 
 69 Peter M. Gilhuly et al., Bankruptcy Without Borders: A Comprehensive Guide to 
the First Decade of Chapter 15, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 54 (2016) [hereinafter 
Gilhuly et al.]; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1507(b) (2018) (“[T]he court shall consider whether 
such additional assistance, consistent with the principles of comity, will reasonably assure 
[protections.]”). 
 70 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2018). 
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continue and reorganize its operations.71 
Notably, Venezuela’s bankruptcy law does not need to be 
identical to the law of the United States.72  Despite stark differences 
in the law, several proceedings have gained recognition by the U.S. 
bankruptcy courts.  For example, in In re ABC Learning Ctrs. Ltd.,73 
a Third Circuit Bankruptcy Court overseeing an Australian 
proceeding permitted “secured creditors to realize the full value of 
their debts, and tender the excess to the company” despite U.S. law 
requiring secured creditors to seek distribution from the bankruptcy 
estate.74  Similarly, a bankruptcy court in the Southern District of 
New York recognized foreign law in an Indian bankruptcy 
proceeding despite it lacking a “formal statutory mechanism for 
creditor participation.”75 
Although enacting a public-sector insolvency law presents some 
difficulty, reviewing more recent and similar situations in Greece 
and Puerto Rico can provide further guidance for Venezuela.  In 
2014, Puerto Rico enacted a bankruptcy law to pursue a debt 
restructuring regime that enabled the government to provide 
services to its citizens.76  The law comprised several different 
chapters similar to U.S. law, but also contained other provisions for 
corporations to restructure.77  Even though the law failed to gain 
recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court because of preemption by 
 
 71 See 11 U.S.C. § 1507(b)(1)–(5) (2018) (stating that courts will consider the “(1) 
just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in the debtor’s property; (2) 
protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the 
processing of claims in such foreign proceeding; (3) prevention of preferential or 
fraudulent dispositions of property of the debtor; (4) distribution of proceeds of the 
debtor’s property substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title; and 
(5) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual that 
such foreign proceeding concerns.”). 
 72 See, e.g., In re Rede Energia S.A., 515 B.R. 69, 104 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“This 
Court will not decline to extend comity and grant additional relief simply because Brazilian 
bankruptcy law is not identical to U.S. bankruptcy law.”). 
 73 In re ABC Learning Ctrs. Ltd., 728 F.3d 301 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
 74 Id. at 310–11. 
 75 In re Ashapura Minechem Ltd., 480 B.R. 129, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 76 See Puerto Rico Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. 
Laws 371. English translation available at 
http://www.lexjuris.com/lexlex/Leyes2014/lexl2014071d.htm [https://perma.cc/8XBH-
L9TD]; see also Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 17 (stating that the law contained a 
“two-tiered consensual and in-court restructuring approach.”). 
 77 See Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 15. 
14 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
the bankruptcy code, this law provides some guidance for 
Venezuela, and importantly, preemption does not apply in 
Venezuela’s situation.78  Greece, on the other hand, successfully 
restructured its debt in 2012 with changes to its legal regime.79  The 
change in law permitted a higher cash payout, changes to legal terms 
that increased the likelihood of the survival of the bonds, and a 
compulsory offer of the exchange that required approval by 
creditors for two-thirds of the remaining principal.80 
Additionally, because this law would represent Venezuela’s 
first public-sector insolvency law, there are presently no existing 
legal barriers that would prohibit the insolvency law from including 
provisions sufficient to receive recognition from a U.S. bankruptcy 
court.  This enables Venezuela to model its law after previously 
recognized laws in other countries.  Courts have recognized other 
foreign bankruptcy laws that include difference of payouts and 
participation mechanisms,81 and therefore Venezuela’s law should 
receive the same treatment if it bears some similarity to them.  
Moreover, Venezuela can mirror the United States’ law as much as 
possible, but as noted earlier, differences are permissible.  However, 
foreign bankruptcy laws that violate U.S. law, restrict a court’s 
ability to administer the proceeding, or violate debtor protections 
have been found to be impermissible by United States courts.82  
Therefore, Venezuela must steer away from permitting these 
actions.  Overall, enacting a public-sector insolvency law presents a 
low barrier for Venezuela to overcome, because Venezuela’s law 
should be recognized by a U.S. court if Venezuela follows the 
examples of other countries or mirrors U.S. bankruptcy law. 
B. Eligibility Requirements for PDVSA 
The second step for Venezuela is making sure PDVSA meets 
the eligibility requirements for a Chapter 15 proceeding under § 
 
 78 See id. 
 79 See Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy, ECON. 
POL’Y 513 (2013). 
 80 Id. at 515. 
 81 See In re Ashapura Minechem Ltd., 480 B.R. 129, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 82 See In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 188–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (proceeding violated U.S. 
privacy law); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 363–72 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(considering violations of debtor protections of the automatic stay); Gilhuly et al., supra 
note 69, at 70–71 (considering whether a foreign proceeding frustrates the Courts’ ability 
to administer the proceeding). 
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109(a).  Section 103(a) explicitly states that the requirements of § 
109(a) applies to Chapter 15,83  which are that only “a person that 
resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the 
United States . . . may be a debtor under this title.”84  The 
Bankruptcy Code defines debtor in Chapter 1 as a “person or 
municipality” who has filed for relief,85  and the Code’s definition 
of person specifically includes corporations but excludes 
“governmental units”86 such as Venezuela.  Governmental unit 
includes an instrumentality of a foreign state or government.87  
Arguably, PDVSA falls into this category, but importantly, 
instrumentality is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.  Courts have 
found state-owned entities to be instrumentalities only where “the 
relationship [between the government and entity is] an active one, 
[and the entity] is actually carrying out some government 
function.”88  In order to prevent classification as Venezuela’s 
instrumentality, PDVSA must argue that it is not carrying out a 
government function because its actions are business motivated, not 
government motivated.89  Fortunately, courts have not squarely 
addressed this issue;90  therefore, a court could rule PDVSA is not 
Venezuela’s instrumentality.  PDVSA would then be eligible by 
classifying as a corporation within the “person” requirement of § 
109(a).91 
However, if PDVSA cannot successfully argue that they are not 
Venezuela’s instrumentality, PDVSA should argue that Chapter 
15’s broader scope warrants eligibility.  Section 1502 defines debtor 
as “an entity that is the subject of a foreign proceeding” with no 
explicit prohibition on governmental units.92  “Entity”, as defined in 
 
 83 See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2018) (stating that Chapter 1 applies in a Chapter 15 
proceeding). 
 84 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018). 
 85 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (2018). 
 86 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2018). 
 87 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2018). 
 88 See In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp. (In Special Liquidation), No. 13-12159, 
2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1990, at *37–38; In re Nortel Networks, Inc. 669 F.3d 128, 138 (3rd 
Cir. 2011); In re Lombard Pub. Facilities Corp. 579 B.R. 493, 15–16 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2017). 
 89 See In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp., 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1990, at *38. 
 90 Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 18–19. 
 91 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018). 
 92 11 U.S.C. §1502(1) (2018). 
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§ 101, includes a “governmental unit” and therefore its 
instrumentality.93  Section 1501(c) explicitly prohibits some entities 
from filing under Chapter 15, but does not explicitly prohibit 
governmental entities and their instrumentalities.94  Notably, some 
courts have recognized the broader scope of Chapter 15 despite 
explicit prohibitions.95  For example, the Eastern District of 
California Bankruptcy Court in In re Tri-Continental Exch. Ltd. 
found that, even though the foreign insurance company debtor was 
explicitly prohibited to file under the Bankruptcy Code by 11 U.S.C. 
§ 109(b)(3), this did not prohibit Chapter 15 relief.96 
Coupled with the broader debtor definition of Chapter 15, some 
of the stated objectives of Chapter 15 are to “provide effective 
mechanisms” to increase cooperation between the United States and 
the foreign country, provide “greater legal certainty for trade and 
investment,” and to rescue financially troubled businesses to 
“protect investment and preserve employment.”97  Courts are 
instructed to consider the “international origin, and the need to 
promote an application of this chapter that is consistent with the 
application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions.”98  
Thus, a court could be persuaded that, since PDVSA is a financially 
troubled and economically significant business in need of rescue, 
the objectives of Chapter 15 warrant finding PDVSA eligible. 
While it is uncertain whether PDVSA would be classified as a 
“person” or be eligible as an “entity,” PDVSA would still need to 
prove it has “property in the United States” to satisfy § 109(a).99   As 
noted in the Introduction, the only property PDVSA currently owns 
in the United States are shares of its subsidiary, PDV Holding.100  As 
will be discussed below, this is likely not sufficient for obtaining 
eligibility, but courts have upheld another option that PDVSA can 
easily meet. 
PDVSA should follow the actions of the entities of In re Suntech 
 
 93 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (2018). 
 94 11 U.S.C. § 1501(c) (2018). 
 95 In re Tri-Continental Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 632 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006). 
 96 See id. 
 97 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (2018). 
 98 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2018). 
 99 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018). 
 100 See Hals, supra note 6. 
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Power Holdings Co.101 and In re International Bank of Azerbaijan102 
and open a bank account in New York to establish “property in the 
United States.”103  In Suntech, the court found that a debtor in a 
foreign proceeding establishing a bank account, held by an agent for 
the debtor, in New York prior to the commencement of a Chapter 
15 was sufficient to render the debtor eligible for a Chapter 15 
case.104  It also noted that even though the debtor had no presence in 
the United States, the debtor “owes a substantial amount of United 
States debt and requires recognition as a condition to the 
enforcement of the scheme of arrangement in the United States.”105  
Without recognition, the debtor “will be hindered from ever 
establishing a United States presence or conducting future business 
in the United States for fear that creditors will seize its United States 
assets.”106  The Court reasoned that “[s]hutting the door on the 
Debtor, where it has no other access, w[ould] hinder the 
restructuring of this multi-national business as contemplated by 
chapter 15.”107  Despite Suntech’s subsidiary being located in 
California, the court found New York to be the proper venue 
because “the assets of a subsidiary are not the assets of the 
parent.”108  Thus, the bank account “represented the Debtor’s 
principal United States asset at the time [of filing] the Chapter 15 
petition.”109 
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Court in International Bank of 
Azerbaijan granted recognition even though the bank accounts in 
the United States represented the only U.S. property of the bank.110  
The International Bank of Azerbaijan claimed that due to their U.S. 
dollar denominated transactions, their economy would be adversely 
 
 101 In re Suntech Power Holdings Co., 520 B.R. 399 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 102 See Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 20, n. 36. 
 103 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018). 
 104 See In re Suntech, 520 B.R. at 399, 411–13; see also In re Octaviar Admin. Pty 
Ltd., 511 B.R. 361, 372 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2014) (noting that a non-interest-bearing trust 
account in New York constitutes property in the United States and transfers of property 
“do not, in and of themselves, constitute grounds for a finding of bad faith.”). 
 105 In re Suntech, 520 B.R. at 413. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 414. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See Walker & Cooper, supra note 7, at 20, n. 36. 
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affected if creditors could seize these assets.111 
Here, New York law already governs PDVSA’s bonds,112  
therefore, PDVSA should open the bank account in New York.  
Notably, the amount of money in the account is irrelevant—PDVSA 
only needs to open an account with the bare minimum deposit 
requirement to meet the statutory requirement.113  Similar to 
Suntech, PDVSA maintains no presence in the United States, but 
owes substantial debt in the United States, and the prevention of the 
§ 363 sale would prohibit the restructuring of this multi-national 
business as contemplated by Chapter 15.114  Likewise, the location 
of PDVSA’s subsidiaries in Delaware are irrelevant, and thus New 
York is the proper venue.115  Moreover, similar to the International 
Bank of Azerbaijan, the U.S. dollar dominates the PDVSA bonds; 
therefore, creditors’ ability to seize these assets would adversely 
affect the Venezuelan economy, particularly because of PDVSA’s 
vital importance.116  Importantly, courts hold that § 109(a) provides 
no standard or inquiry into the circumstances of acquiring the 
property—debtors need only have property to meet the plain 
meaning of the statute.117  Thus, PDVSA should be treated the same 




 111 See id. 
 112 See, e.g., PDVSA 12.75% SENIOR NOTES DUE 2022, 6 (2011), available at 
https://www.bourse.lu/security/USP7807HAM71/172640 [https://perma.cc/U48W-
P5GS] [hereinafter PDVSA]. 
 113 See In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 39 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) 
(“[W]e conclude that the bank accounts constitute property in the United States for 
purposes of eligibility under section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code, regardless of how much 
money was actually in them on the petition date.”). 
 114 See In re Suntech, 520 B.R. at 399, 413. 
 115 See id. at 414. 
 116 See, e.g., PDVSA, supra note 112. 
 117 See In re Suntech, 520 B.R. at 413; see also In re Octaviar, 511 B.R. at 373 (“The 
imposition of a requirement that property in the United States be ‘substantial,’ for example, 
would subvert the intent of Congress and the plain meaning of the statute.”). 
 118 Because the Venezuelan bankruptcy proceeding would be comprised by PDVSA 
and its Venezuelan subsidiaries, all of these entities would be debtors in the Chapter 15 
proceeding.  See Organization Chart, PDVSA, 
http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6544&Itemid
=889&lang=en [https://perma.cc/PCW2-Z8WU]. 
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C. Obtaining Recognition of the Venezuelan Bankruptcy 
Proceeding 
The third step for PDVSA is to obtain recognition.  Recognition 
is defined as “the entry of an order granting recognition of a foreign 
main proceeding or a foreign nonmain proceeding.”119  In order for 
this to occur, the foreign representative120  must file a petition for 
recognition,121  which commences the case.122  This petition must 
meet the requirements of §§ 1515 and 1517, and the foreign 
representative bears the burden of proving the proceeding as a 
foreign main or nonmain proceeding.123  A foreign main proceeding 
is a “foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor 
has the center of its main interests,”124 while a foreign nonmain 
proceeding is “a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main 
proceeding, pending in a country where the debtor has an 
establishment.”125  Since PDVSA operates and has its main interests 
in Venezuela, it meets the definition of a foreign main proceeding.  
In order to prove the existence of a foreign main proceeding, the 
foreign representative must prove all of the following seven criteria: 
(1) The existence of a proceeding; (2) that is either judicial or 
administrative; (3) that is collective in nature; (4) that is in a foreign 
country; (5) that is authorized or conducted under a law related to 
insolvency or the adjustment of debts; (6) in which the debtor’s 
assets and affairs are subject to the control or supervision of a 
foreign court; and (7) which proceeding is for the purpose of 
 
 119 11 U.S.C. § 1502(7) (2018). 
 120 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (2018).  A foreign representative is defined as “a person or 
body, including a person or body appointed on an interim basis, authorized in a foreign 
proceeding to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets or 
affairs or to act as a representative of such foreign proceeding.”  Id. 
 121 11 U.S.C. § 1515(a) (2018); 11 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2018) (“A petition for 
recognition shall be accompanied by—(1) a certificated copy of the decision commencing 
such foreign proceeding and appointing the foreign representative; (2) a certificate from 
the foreign court affirming the existence of such foreign proceeding and of the appointment 
of the foreign representative; or (3) in the absence of evidence referred to in paragraphs 
(1) and (2), any other evidence acceptable to the court of the existence of such foreign 
proceeding and of the appointment of the foreign representative.”). 
 122 11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2018). 
 123 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1515, 1517 (2018). 
 124 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4) (2018). 
 125 11 U.S.C. § 1502(2); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1502(5) (2018) (defining establishment 
as “any place of operations where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic 
activity.”). 
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reorganization or liquidation.126 
The first step is whether a proceeding exists.  A proceeding for 
PDVSA’s purposes would mean a “statutory framework that 
constrains a company’s actions and that regulates the final 
distribution of a company’s assets.”127  This is satisfied with 
Venezuela’s public-sector insolvency law.  The second step requires 
the proceeding to be judicial or administrative, which PDVSA 
solves by filing their case under the bankruptcy law.128  No issue 
arises for the third step or fourth step because a bankruptcy 
proceeding would be taking place in Venezuela to collect.  
Likewise, since the public-sector bankruptcy law grants control or 
supervision of PDVSA’s assets by the Venezuelan court, and 
reorganization is the purpose, PDVSA satisfies the remaining 
criteria. 
Once a court recognizes the foreign main proceeding in 
Venezuela, PDVSA gains access to mandatory relief that is 
automatically given under § 1520.129  Notably, § 1520 provides 
relief for the debtor’s assets “within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States” which includes tangible and intangible property.130 
The relief granted by § 1520 includes an automatic stay granted 
by § 362, which protects the debtor’s assets from creditor actions,131 
control of the debtor’s affairs by the foreign representative during 
the administration of the case, and the use of § 363 to dispose of the 
debtor’s property free and clear of any adverse interests,132  which 
will be discussed below.  The stay would give PDVSA time to carry 
out the bankruptcy, as well as relief from the requirement to 
continue paying creditors while the case is ongoing. 
Further, § 1521 allows the court to grant additional permissive 
 
 126 See In re Ashapura Minechem Ltd., 480 B.R. at 136; see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) 
(2018) (defining “foreign proceeding.”). 
 127 Gilhuly et al., supra note 69, at 90. 
 128 See id. 
 129 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a) (2018). 
 130 Id. (“‘[W]ithin the territorial jurisdiction of the United States’, when used with 
reference to property of a debtor, refers to tangible property located within the territory of 
the United States and intangible property deemed under applicable non-bankruptcy law to 
be located within that territory, including any property subject to attachment or 
garnishment that may properly be seized or garnished by an action in a Federal or State 
court in the United States.”). 
 131 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2018). 
 132 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a) (2018). 
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relief “where necessary to effectuate the purpose of this chapter and 
to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors.”133  
This includes staying protections of PDVSA’s assets that have not 
been stayed by the automatic stay under § 1520, suspension of 
transfer rights, and extending relief granted under § 1519.134  
Additionally, § 1521 allows the court to grant any relief the Code 
allows for a bankruptcy trustee.135  Importantly, this could mean that 
the assets of PDVSA’s non-Venezuelan entities, such as PDV 
Holding and CITGO, who are not “debtors” in the Chapter 15 
proceeding could receive protection. 
D. Potential Stumbling Blocks to Recognition 
PDVSA faces two stumbling blocks that may preclude a U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court from recognizing its foreign main proceeding.  
The first stumbling block occurs if a court invokes § 1506 and 
refuses to take action “if the action would be manifestly contrary to 
the public policy of the United States.”136  It is possible that courts 
could find recognizing a Venezuelan bankruptcy proceeding to be 
contrary to public policy due to the United States’ tense relationship 
with Venezuela and the corrupt history of the Maduro regime.  
However, the public policy provision is seldom used, largely 
because the term “manifestly” constrains the ability of a judge to 
invoke the provision.137  For example, in In re OAS S.A.,138 a 
Brazilian bankruptcy law had substantial issues, including that it did 
not provide “procedural and substantive fairness” to certain senior 
noteholders, eliminated creditors’ “ability to avoid [certain] inter-
debtor transfers,” and failed to provide a remedy for fraudulent 
transfers.139  Still, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern 
District of New York did not invoke the public policy exception to 
prevent recognition of the Brazilian bankruptcy law,140 because the 
Brazilian bankruptcy law met the United States’ “fundamental 
standards of fairness and accord[ed] with the course of civilized 
 
 133 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a) (2018). 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. 
 136 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2018). 
 137 See In re ABC Learning Ctrs. Ltd., 728 F.3d 301, 309 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
 138 In re OAS S.A., 533 B.R. 83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 139 Id. at 104. 
 140 See id. at 106. 
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jurisprudence.”141  Similarly, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Delaware elected not to invoke the public policy 
provision in In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp.,142  despite the foreign 
law creating an unfair proceeding.  In that case, the “Irish 
proceeding discriminate[d] against or disadvantage[d] U.S. 
Citizens, deprive[d] U.S. creditors of due process, [was] 
procedurally unfair . . . and [did] not grant the same fundamental 
rights that creditors would receive in [a] U.S. Bankruptcy 
Courts.”143  However, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court refused to find the 
Irish bankruptcy law to be manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy, 
because it found that the Irish bankruptcy law did not involve 
“constitutional or statutory rights available in the United States.”144  
The Court reasoned that the foreign law “‘established a different 
way to achieve similar goals’ of United States statutes . . . [and the 
foreign law] support[ed] the strong public policy of the United 
States in favor of a universalism approach to complex multinational 
bankruptcy proceedings.”145 
In contrast, courts invoke the exception when the proceeding 
“‘would impinge severely a U.S. constitutional or statutory right’ 
and . . . an action should not be taken in a chapter 15 proceeding 
where taking such action would frustrate a U.S. court’s ability to 
administer the chapter 15 proceeding.”146  For example, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found in 
In re Toft that the foreign representative’s reason for filing a Chapter 
15 case impinged severely on a U.S. constitutional right.147  The 
representative attempted to gain access to the debtor’s email 
accounts, which were stored on the servers of internet service 
providers located in the United States.148  This invoked the 
prohibition of being manifestly contrary to public policy because 
“the relief sought by the Foreign Representative [was] banned under 
U.S. law, and it would result in criminal liability . . . [by] directly 
 
 141 Id. at 103. 
 142 In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp., No. 13-12159, 2014 WL 9953792, at *88-102 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2014). 
 143 Id. at 58. 
 144 Id. at 70. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Gilhuly et al., supra note 69, at 70–71. 
 147 In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 148 Id. at 188–96. 
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compromise[ing] privacy rights . . . . [This] ‘would impinge 
severely a U.S. constitutional or statutory right.’”149  Similarly, the 
Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of New York invoked the 
public policy exception in In re Gold & Honey, Ltd.  The proceeding 
“reward[ed] and legitimize[d the creditors’] violation of both the 
automatic stay and . . . [the bankruptcy court’s orders] regarding the 
stay[,]” which are two of the most fundamental policies of the 
automatic stay.150  Therefore, it appears that “manifestly contrary to 
public policy” is a high standard, and even if a public-sector 
insolvency law enacted in Venezuela contains potentially 
problematic elements, the U.S. bankruptcy courts still may be 
unlikely to find it to violate § 1506.  Moreover, if the United States 
lifts its sanctions against Venezuela, this means a friendlier 
relationship with the country and the government is in place, and 
because of this, a court could be persuaded that this presents 
sufficient evidence not to invoke the public policy exception. 
The second stumbling block Venezuela faces is a finding by a 
U.S. court that the law fraudulently permits PDVSA to refuse 
payment to creditors.  A court could find the law to be fraudulent 
because the only reason that Venezuela would make a bankruptcy 
law is to get PDVSA out of paying its creditors and enacting one 
was not considered at the time of the issuance of the bonds.  
However, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of 
New York refused to deny recognition in In re International Bank 
of Azerbaijan despite fraudulent objections against Azerbaijan’s 
amendment to its bankruptcy law immediately before filing for 
Chapter 15.151  This amendment prevented substantive and 
procedural due process and allowed preference of creditors, and yet 
the court recognized the proceeding because it did not violate 
fundamental principles of the United States.152  Moreover, the 
contract language of the PDVSA bonds clarifies that a Venezuelan 
bankruptcy was considered at the time of issuance.  Specifically, 
under the “Risk Factors” subheading in the contract, if PDVSA is 
“subjected to Venezuelan bankruptcy or insolvency law, the ability 
of the Noteholders to recover their investment in the Notes will be 
substantially impaired and will be subordinated to several classes of 
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creditors.”153  Additionally, Venezuela passing a bankruptcy law 
signals to the courts that they are providing the opportunity for 
PDVSA and other public-sector companies to restructure their debts 
fairly and effectively to prevent a default.154  Thus, it is possible that 
a court will grant recognition by refusing to find the law to be 
fraudulent. 
E. Confirmation Plan with a Section 363 Sale 
Because of PDVSA’s importance to the Venezuelan economy, 
confirming a plan where Venezuela relinquishes control and 
ownership of PDVSA is not an option.  This conflicts with the 
absolute priority rule, one of the key features of the American 
bankruptcy system, which states that equity holders in the bankrupt 
business cannot receive or retain anything under the confirmed plan 
unless all of the unsecured creditors are paid in full.155  If the 
Venezuelan bankruptcy plan violated such a key tenet of American 
bankruptcy law, it is unlikely that the plan would be confirmed by 
the U.S. bankruptcy courts. 
One possible workaround for this problem would be to confirm 
a plan around a § 363 sale of substantially all of PDVSA’s assets156 
to a new entity, New PDVSA, that is wholly owned by the 
government of Venezuela.157  Under this plan, the government 
would create a new corporate entity for the purpose of buying 
PDVSA’s assets, then use the bankruptcy procedure to “auction” 
PDVSA, with the new corporate entity as a stalking horse bidder.158  
A stalking horse bid is an initial bid on the bankrupt company’s 
assets used by the debtor to prevent against low bidding.159  In this 
case, the amount bid and the terms attached by New PDVSA would 
be used to dissuade other potential buyers from bidding on 
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PDVSA.160  The most important of the terms to dissuade other 
bidders is the Republic’s retention of the actual rights to the 
hydrocarbon reserves.  Because PDVSA does not own the rights to 
these reserves, the rights are not in the bankruptcy estate, and would 
not be sold, so no entity other than a government-controlled entity 
would be guaranteed access to the oil reserves.161  Thus, no company 
would risk purchasing an oil company without access to the oil 
reserves.  Moreover, the new entity would make a bid with such 
generous terms that no other entity would be likely to match or 
surpass it, and even if an entity did, acquiring assets without access 
to the oil reserves makes little economic sense. 
This plan would allow Venezuela to retain ownership of 
PDVSA through its new entity free and clear of any adverse 
interests,162  which would clear adverse interests worth billions of 
dollars from secured and unsecured creditors, bond holders, 
promissory note holders, and judicial claims.163  Following its 
acquisition, New PDVSA would operate with none of PDVSA’s 
currently held debt, which should allow the new entity to be 
profitable again.164  The money given by New PDVSA for these 
assets would then be used by PDVSA to pay its creditors based on 
the priority of their claims.  This purchase price could be funded by 
new debt issued by either the new entity or the government. 
Such a plan would not violate the absolute priority rule, so long 
as New PDVSA’s bid was for the full value of the assets it 
purchases.  The absolute priority rule prevents an equity owner of 
the debtor from receiving or retaining assets of the debtor only on 
account of its equity interest.165  However, there is an exception to 
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this rule, the new value corollary, that allows the equity holders of 
a debtor to receive assets under a plan if they provide new value to 
the bankruptcy estate that is money or money’s worth and is equal 
to the full value of the assets received.166  Under this proposed plan, 
the government of Venezuela is not receiving anything on account 
of their interest in PDVSA.  It would instead receive any assets 
PDVSA receives (to the degree to which it receives any assets while 
acting through New PDVSA) account of the new value it has 
contributed to the estate through the § 363 sale.  Because the bid 
amount must be large enough to dissuade other creditors from 
bidding, it should be enough to cover the full value of the assets.  
Therefore, this plan does not violate the absolute priority rule. 
While it may seem improbable that this type of § 363 sale would 
be confirmed by U.S. bankruptcy courts, a similar deal was 
confirmed in In re General Motors.167  In General Motors, a § 363 
sale was permitted where a new entity, New GM, purchased the 
assets of GM, and the U.S. Treasury Department purchased a sixty 
percent interest in New GM.168  The court found this permissible 
because GM did not receive a better offer than the one from the U.S. 
government, independent advisors found the offer to be fair, and 
there was no other feasible way for GM to restructure its business 
and remain viable.169  Although it may seem that a Venezuelan 
bankruptcy plan that results in investors holding bonds for a New 
PDVSA that remains under the control of the Venezuelan 
government would be contrary to U.S. public policy, General 
Motors suggests that a bankruptcy court may accept this type of 
plan.  As long as the plan is fair to creditors and there are not more 
beneficial alternatives, General Motors provides at least a colorable 
argument that a § 363 plan may be confirmed. 
F. Benefits of Filing for a Chapter 15 Bankruptcy 
While the likelihood of PDVSA passing every stage of a 
Chapter 15 may be relatively low, it would be unwise for PDVSA 
not to file for bankruptcy because of the possible leverage and other 
benefits it will receive if it is filed.  As noted above, the relief 
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provided by the court at each step protects PDVSA’s assets for at 
least a temporary period of time.170  If confirmed, which would be 
the best-case scenario, the PDVSA plan eliminates or significantly 
reduces billions of dollars of debt from bondholders, promissory 
note holders, and any judicial claims against PDVSA and its 
Venezuelan entities.  Additionally, PDVSA’s non-Venezuelan 
entities, such as PDV Holding and CITGO, may also receive 
protection and a discharge of its debt from PDVSA’s Chapter 15 
proceeding if they successfully argue that the automatic stay should 
extend to protect their assets.171 
Even if the plan fails to get confirmed, at the very least, a few 
extra months free and clear of creditor collection actions gives 
PDVSA an ability to seek out-of-court restructuring options while 
the Bankruptcy Court makes its decision.  Moreover, if potential 
holdout creditors face the threat of a bankruptcy plan being 
confirmed, PDVSA yields greater leverage in its out-of-court 
restructuring negotiations.  This leverage provides a potential 
method of binding holdout creditors through bankruptcy law, which 
it does not have under the terms of its current bonds.  Given the 
value of some of the claims, risking a cramdown from bankruptcy 
should incentivize some creditors to be more willing to negotiate in 
an out-of-court proceeding, rather than elect to holdout and risk 
recouping less under the bankruptcy. 
A Chapter 15 bankruptcy provides PDVSA protection and 
leverage that no other restructuring plan can offer—protection of its 
assets and an increased likelihood of confirming an out of court 
restructuring while simultaneously presenting its own restructuring 
possibility that would leave it free and clear of any adverse interests.  
Moreover, the likelihood of an out-of-court restructuring increases 
with each requirement that PDVSA meets.  Thus, whether the 
Chapter 15 process results in a confirmed bankruptcy plan with a § 
363 sale, brings creditors to the negotiating table, or merely 
provides a temporary stay, Chapter 15 is a win-win option for 
PDVSA. 
IV. Conclusion 
Venezuela’s current economic crisis presents an extremely 
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complex and difficult restructuring for PDVSA.  This Note aimed 
at pursuing one option—a Chapter 15 proceeding.  However, this 
type of restructuring raises serious concerns that would need to be 
addressed if used.  First, it is highly unlikely that the current regime 
desires being subject to United States’ jurisdiction and discovery for 
a bankruptcy proceeding.  Thus, this type of proceeding may only 
be possible with a regime change.  Second, with the reserves 
running lower every day, PDVSA would want to restructure sooner 
rather than later.  A bankruptcy proceeding, particularly one as 
complex as this, could take longer than a year.  This may not be time 
that Venezuela or PDVSA can spare.  Yet, this proposal is appealing 
for that same reason—PDVSA can maximize its out-of-court 
restructuring options while the bankruptcy proceeding is taking 
place.  Third, PDVSA may lack the funding required to consummate 
a § 363 sale.  Unlike in General Motors where the company received 
funding from the U.S. government to keep control, PDVSA is not 
in the same position to receive funding from its government because 
of the economic crisis.  This could be problematic for the 
government of Venezuela because they need to keep control of 
PDVSA.  Thus, funding for the PDVSA sale will most likely have 
to come from somewhere else.  This funding should at least be for 
the short term to consummate the sale in hope that, after the sale, 
PDVSA will get back on its feet and improve its economic position.  
Fourth, it is unclear if PDVSA would be eligible for relief under 
Chapter 15 because PDVSA is likely an instrumentality of the 
government of Venezuela, thereby a governmental unit as defined 
in § 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus explicitly ineligible 
for relief.  This hinges upon a court finding that PDVSA is actually 
carrying out some governmental function.  However, as noted 
earlier, PDVSA may still gain relief if PDVSA fails to meet this 
requirement by arguing Chapter15’s broader scope warrants 
eligibility.  Fifth, creditors, such as Crystallex, have filed suit 
against Venezuela seeking to pierce the veil under the alter ego 
doctrine172  to acquire CITGO assets worth over a billion dollars, if 
not protected by sovereign immunity.173  If successful, other 
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creditors will surely follow suit.  Sixth, PDV Holding and CITGO 
represent vital assets of PDVSA outside of Venezuela that need 
protection, because they most likely would not be allowed to file for 
bankruptcy in Venezuela, even if the Venezuelan bankruptcy law 
permits it. 
Thus, in order to protect these assets, PDVSA must pursue other 
options to protect these assets.  This may include filing these 
companies under Chapter 11, moving the account receivables assets 
into a bank in Venezuela to prevent seizure from creditors, or 
arguing that the relief and protection from the Chapter 15 
proceeding should extend to these entities.  Notwithstanding these 
concerns, filing bankruptcy under Chapter 15 offers PDVSA a 
possible debt restructuring option that can eliminate all of PDVSA’s 
debt if confirmed.  Even if unsuccessful, it provides benefits and 
leverage to pursue other out of court options while the bankruptcy 
court makes its decision. 
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